

## Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 NEA-10 IO-13 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00  
USIE-00 INRE-00 FEA-01 CIAE-00 INR-07 L-03  
NSAE-00 NSC-05 EB-07 NRC-05 OES-07 DODE-00  
ERDA-05 SS-15 SP-02 PM-05 H-01 PA-01 PRS-01 /111 W  
-----051655 231206Z /44

O P 231051Z JUL 77  
FM USMISSION GENEVA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9607  
INFO AMEMBASSY VIENNA IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY NEWDELHI PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY/AMCONSUL BOMBAY PRIORITY 29  
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L GENEVA 6205

USEEC USIAEA

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PARM TECH IAEA IN UR CA  
SUBJECT: INDIA-IAEA SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT COVERING USSR-SUPPLIED  
HEAVY WATER

REF: STATE 171032

1. ACDA DIRECTOR WARNKE TOOK OPPORTUNITY OF JULY 22 BILATERAL  
RESTRICTED CTB SESSION (HEADS OF DELEGATION AND DEPUTIES -- MOROKHOV,  
TIMERBAEV ON SOVIET SIDE; WARNKE, JOHNSON ON U.S. SIDE) TO RAISE  
INDIA-IAEA AGREEMENT.

2. WARNKE TOLD MOROKHOV THAT U.S. WAS CONCERNED BY INDIAN RESIST-  
ANCE SO FAR TO AGENCY'S EFFORTS TO HAVE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT APPLY  
TO ENTIRE RAJASTHAN POWER STATION. HE STRESSED COMMON U.S.-SOVIET  
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OBJECTIVES IN NON-PROLIFERATION AREA AND IMPORTANCE OF WORKING TO-  
GETHER TO FURTHER THOSE OBJECTIVES. USSR AND U.S. BOTH HAD PARTI-  
CULAR INTEREST IN SATISFACTORY RESOLUTION OF DIFFICULTIES OVER  
INDIA-IAEA AGREEMENT CITING SOVIET ROLE AS SUPPLIER OF HEAVY WATER  
AND PRESENCE OF U.S.-ORIGIN HEAVY WATER IN RAPP-I REACTOR. HE SAID  
THAT U.S. STRONGLY SUPPORTS IAEA'S POSITION THAT SAFEGUARDS AGREE-  
MENT SHOULD APPLY BOTH TO RAPP-I AND RAPP-II ON A PERMANENT BASIS.

NOTING THAT HE HAD RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS THAT MORNING, WARNKE INDICATED THAT USG HOPED SOVIET GOVERNMENT WOULD USE INFLUENCE PROVIDED BY HEAVY WATER SUPPLIES TO URGE INDIA TO ACCEPT IAEA POSITION ON AGREEMENT.

3. MOROKHOV SAID SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAD AGREED TO SUPPLY HEAVY WATER TO INDIA ON CONDITION THAT IAEA SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT WOULD BE CONCLUDED PROVIDING FOR SAFEGUARDS ON HEAVY WATER AND ON FACILITIES AS LONG AS SOVIET-SUPPLIED HEAVY WATER PRESENT IN THE FACILITIES. HE INDICATED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT HAD MADE REPRESENTATIONS TO INDIA ABOUT ABSENCE OF SUCH AN AGREEMENT, AND THAT INDIAN GOVERNMENT HAD GIVEN ASSURANCES THAT NONE OF SOVIET-SUPPLIED HEAVY WATER WOULD BE USED UNTIL SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT IN FORCE. MOROKHOV SAID SOVIETS ALSO WARNED INDIA THAT FURTHER DELIVERIES OF HEAVY WATER WOULD BE HELD UP PENDING ENTRY INTO FORCE OF AGREEMENT, AND THAT DELIVERIES HAD INDEED BEEN SUSPENDED. HE MAINTAINED THAT SOVIET UNION HAD ALWAYS TAKEN STRONGEST POSITION ON SAFEGUARDS, AND THAT SUPPLY OF HEAVY WATER TO INDIA WAS FULLY CONSISTENT WITH SOVIET OBLIGATIONS UNDER NPT AND LONDON SUPPLIERS' GUIDELINES. AS AN ASIDE, HE MENTIONED THAT SOVIETS HAD BEEN TROUBLED BY U.S. DECISION TO SUPPLY ENRICHED URANIUM TO INDIA WITHOUT "COMPLETE GUARANTEES," BUT HAD FELT IT WOULD NOT BE "TACTFUL" TO RAISE MATTER WITH U.S.

4. CLAIMING THAT HE HAD RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS TO SEE US ON ANOTHER NON-PROLIFERATION MATTER, MOROKHOV THEN LAUNCHED INTO LENGTHY CONFIDENTIAL

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CRITICISM OF FAILURE OF IAEA-EURATOM SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT TO COME INTO FORCE. HE SAID SUBSIDIARY ARRANGEMENTS HAD NOT BEEN ELABORATED. EURATOM COUNTRIES, PARTICULARLY FRG, DEMANDED A PRIVILEGED POSITION COMPARED TO OTHER NPT PARTIES. THOSE PRIVILEGES INCLUDED NOT GIVING IAEA RIGHT TO CARRY OUT INDEPENDENT INSPECTIONS. TIME LIMIT HAD PASSED, AND QUESTION ARISES OF RAISING MATTER WITH UN SECURITY COUNCIL. MOROKHOV ASSERTED THAT SOVIET GOVERNMENT WAS "RESOLVED" TO BRING QUESTION TO SECURITY COUNCIL, BUT BEFORE DOING SO WISHED TO CONSULT THE U.S.

5. WARNKE SAID HE NOTED MOROKHOV'S POINTS ON EURATOM SAFEGUARDS ISSUE. RETURNING TO HEAVY WATER QUESTION, HE REITERATED U.S. HOPE THAT SOVIETS WOULD RECOGNIZE IMPORTANCE OF REACHING FULLY SATISFACTORY SOLUTION FROM NON-PROLIFERATION STANDPOINT AND WOULD URGE INDIA TO ACCEPT IAEA PROPOSAL, WHICH, AS HE UNDERSTOOD IT, WOULD APPLY SAFEGUARDS TO RAPP-I AND RAPP-II AS WELL AS MATERIALS PRODUCED IN BOTH ON PERMANENT BASIS WHETHER OR NOT INDIGENOUSLY PRODUCED HEAVY WATER LATER SUBSTITUTED FOR SOVIET-ORIGIN HEAVY WATER.

6. MOROKHOV REPLIED THAT SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAD ALWAYS EMPHASIZED SANCTITY OF INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS AND WOULD NOT WISH TO GO BEYOND AGREEMENTS ALREADY CONCLUDED. HE REITERATED SOVIET SUPPORT FOR

STRINGENT SAFEGUARDS, CITING SOVIET PROPOSAL IN LONDON SUPPLIERS' GROUP FOR FULL-SCOPE SAFEGUARDS.

7. AT RECEPTION LATER IN DAY, TIMERBAEV TOLD U.S. DELEGATION OFFICER THAT SOVIETS WERE SYMPATHETIC WITH U.S. AND AGENCY'S POSITIONS ON COVERAGE OF BOTH REACTORS AND SUBSTITUTION, AND WOULD CERTAINLY SUPPORT AGREEMENT IF AGENCY AND INDIA COULD REACH AGREEMENT THAT TOOK CARE OF THOSE POINTS IN MANNER DESIRED BY U.S. HOWEVER, THERE WERE POLITICAL FACTORS INVOLVED, AND SOVIET GOVERNMENT COULD NOT INSIST ON ACCEPTANCE OF THOSE CONDITIONS BY INDIA. HE MAINTAINED, IN PARTICULAR, THAT THERE WAS NO PRECEDENT FOR DEALING WITH SUBSTITUTION PROBLEM AS AGENCY PREFERRED. HE CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT SOVIETS COULD NOT PRESS INDIA TO GO BEYOND INTERNATIONAL UNDERTAKINGS SUCH AS LONDON GROUP GUIDELINES.  
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8. COMMENT: FROM MOROKHOV'S EVASIVE REPLIES ON SPECIFIC MATTERS OF CONCERN TO US, AS WELL AS TIMERBAEV'S MORE DIRECT RESPONSES, WE HAVE CLEAR IMPRESSION THAT SOVIETS (OR AT LEAST MOROKHOV) WILL NOT WISH TO INTERVENE WITH THE INDIANS ON BEHALF OF AGENCY'S POSITION ON SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT.  
WARNKE

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## Message Attributes

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